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ABSTRACT
This Article examines the Federal Communications
Commission’s (“FCC”) regulation of profane language since
2004. That year is when the FCC, facing a moral panic, radically
altered its profanity tack. Unlike obscenity and indecency,
profanity—a third content category over which the Commission
holds statutory authority—is seldom analyzed.
This Article argues that the FCC’s current definition of profane
language not only strips its meaning from its religious roots, but
also: (1) is both unconstitutionally vague and overbroad; and (2)
violates core First Amendment principles against censoring
speech that merely offends. The U.S. Supreme Court’s
reinvigorated emphasis on safeguarding offensive expression in
cases such as Matal v. Tam and Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v.
Colorado Civil Rights Commission further portends the
unconstitutionality of the FCC’s profanity classification.
In brief, when the Commission abruptly gutted its old definition
of profane language fifteen years ago, that term became an empty
vessel. The FCC then poured into it an unconstitutionally
nebulous effort to censor sexual speech that is neither obscene
nor indecent. This Article concludes that Congress should
jettison the FCC’s statutory power over profane language if the
Commission fails to readily articulate a new definition that is
narrow and clear.
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INTRODUCTION
Shortly after Ajit Pai became chairman of the Federal
Communications Commission 1 (“FCC” or “Commission”) in
January 2017, 2 he observed that “the law that is on the books
today requires that broadcasters keep it clean so to speak.” 3 The
FCC’s Enforcement Bureau now can put that law to the test.
That is because the Parents Television Council 4 (“PTC”), which
boasts a long history of “[h]olding the FCC’s metaphorical feet
to the fire to enforce the law,” 5 filed a complaint against a
Washington, D.C.-area television station over a May 2018
episode of ABC’s Good Morning America that featured the word
“fuck.” 6
As Melissa Henson, the PTC’s program director,
described it in a letter to Rosemary Harold, chief of the FCC’s
Enforcement Bureau, 7 Good Morning America broadcast “a
prerecorded piece about disgraced movie mogul Harvey
Weinstein.” 8 The segment incorporated an audio clip of
SiriusXM satellite radio host Howard Stern interviewing actress
Gwyneth Paltrow about an encounter she had with Weinstein. 9
In that clip, Stern—referencing Paltrow’s then-boyfriend, actor
Brad Pitt—exclaims “[w]hen you tell Brad, Brad says, ‘Fuck this
1
The FCC “regulates interstate and international communications by radio,
television, wire, satellite and cable in all 50 states, the District of Columbia and U.S.
territories. An independent U.S. government agency overseen by Congress, the
[C]ommission is the United States’ primary authority for communications law,
regulation and technological innovation.” About the FCC: What We Do, FED. COMM.
COMMISSION, https://www.fcc.gov/about-fcc/what-we-do (last visited Mar. 1,
2018). The FCC was created in 1934. See 47 U.S.C. § 151 (2012) (providing an
overview of the FCC’s authority and mission).
2
See About the FCC: Leadership, Ajit Pai, FED. COMM. COMMISSION,
https://www.fcc.gov/about/leadership/ajit-pai (last visited Mar. 1, 2019) (noting
that Pai “was designated Chairman by President Donald J. Trump in January
2017”).
3
John Eggerton, FCC’s Pai on Broadcast TV: ‘Keep It Clean’, B ROAD. & CABLE (Feb.
16, 2017), https://www.broadcastingcable.com/news/fccs-pai-broadcast-tv-keep-itclean-163412.
4
The Parents Television Commission describes its mission as protecting “children
and families from graphic sex, violence and profanity in the media, because of their
proven long-term harmful effects.” The PTC Mission, PARENTS TELEVISION COUNCIL,
http://w2.parentstv.org/main/About/mission.aspx (last visited Mar. 1, 2018).
5
Clay Calvert & Robert D. Richards, The Parents Television Council Uncensored: An
Inside Look at the Watchdog of the Public Airwaves and the War on Indecency with Its
President, Tim Winter, 33 HASTINGS COMM . & ENT. L.J. 293, 295 (2011).
6
John Eggerton, PTC Files Indecency Complaint Against Sinclair’s WJLA Over ‘GMA’ FBomb, BROAD . & CABLE (June 11, 2018),
https://www.broadcastingcable.com/news/ptc-files-indecency-complaint-againstsinclairs-wjla-over-gma-f-bomb.
7
Letter from Melissa Henson, Program Director of the Parents Television Council,
to Rosemary Harold, Chief of the Enforcement Bureau of the Federal
Communications Commissions (May 30, 2018) (on file with author).
8
Id.
9
Id.
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guy I’m going to go over and confront him.’” 10 Henson’s
missive, copied to all five FCC commissioners, pointed out that
Stern’s utterance of fuck “occurred during a taped and edited
package segment. The network had every opportunity to edit the
word out before it went to air.” 11
What can the FCC do about such language? It lacks the
power to forbid or censor speech on the broadcast airwaves in
advance of publication. 12 That rule squares with the timehonored First Amendment 13 doctrine that prior restraints on
expression are presumptively unconstitutional. 14 Yet when it
comes to subsequent punishments 15 —sanctions imposed on
over-the-air broadcast stations for sexually explicit expression
they have already carried 16—the FCC wields a regulatory trident.
Specifically, Congress vests the Commission with
statutory authority under 18 U.S.C. § 1464 to punish
broadcasters via license revocation, 17 monetary forfeitures 18 and
cease-and-desist orders 19 for carrying three types of content:
obscenity, indecency and profanity. 20 Although, the FCC
10

Id.
Id.
12
The Communications Act of 1934 provides that:
Nothing in this Chapter shall be understood or
construed to give the Commission the power of
censorship over the radio communications or
signals transmitted by any radio station, and
no regulation or condition shall be
promulgated or fixed by the Commission
which shall interfere with the right of free
speech by means of radio communication.
47 U.S.C. § 326 (2012).
13
The First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides, in pertinent part, that
“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press.”
U.S. CONST. amend. I. The Free Speech and Free Press Clauses were incorporated
more than ninety years ago through the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause
as fundamental liberties to apply to state and local government entities and officials.
See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925).
14
N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971). See Neb. Press Ass’n v.
Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 559 (1976) (“[P]rior restraints on speech and publication are the
most serious and the least tolerable infringement on First Amendment rights.”).
15
See generally Alexander v. United States, 509 U.S. 544, 550 (1993) (noting “the
distinction, solidly grounded in our cases, between prior restraints and subsequent
punishments”); WXIA-TV v. Georgia, 811 S.E.2d 378, 386 (2018) (“In the context
of the First Amendment, the courts traditionally have distinguished between prior
restraints and subsequent punishments, and they usually have subjected prior
restraints to more exacting scrutiny.”).
16
See generally Barrett v. Walker City Sch. Dist., 872 F.3d 1209, 1223 (11th Cir. 2017)
(noting that subsequent punishments “regulate a given type of speech by penalizing
the speech only after it occurs”) (emphasis in original).
17
47 U.S.C. § 312(a)(6) (2012).
18
47 U.S.C. § 503(b) (2012).
19
47 U.S.C. § 312(b) (2012).
20
See 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (2012) (“Whoever utters any obscene, indecent, or profane
language by means of radio communication shall be fined under this title or
imprisoned not more than two years, or both.”).
11
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punishes stations for airing obscenity at all times of the day, 21 it
penalizes them for indecency and profanity only during a
sixteen-hour period stretching from 6 a.m. to 10 p.m. 22 Of these
three categories, profanity—in the parlance of our times 23—is the
ugly (and ignored) stepchild. It also is this Article’s focus.
While the United States Supreme Court has addressed
both obscenity 24 and indecency, 25 it has not directly analyzed the
21

See 47 C.F.R. § 73.3999(a) (2018) (“No licensee of a radio or television broadcast
station shall broadcast any material which is obscene.”).
22
See 47 C.F.R. § 73.3999(b) (2018) (“No licensee of a radio or television broadcast
station shall broadcast on any day between 6 a.m. and 10 p.m. any material which is
indecent.”); Obscenity, Indecency & Profanity—FAQ, FED. COMM. COMMISSION,
https://web.archive.org/web/20170204143249/https://www.fcc.gov/reportsresearch/guides/obscenity-indecency-profanity-faq (last visited Mar. 1, 2019) (“FCC
decisions also prohibit the broadcast of profane material between 6 a.m. and 10
p.m.”).
23
The ugly stepchild, although perhaps politically incorrect, is a common phrase in
the news media. See, e.g., Rachel Abrams, Can Taco Bell Architect Duplicate Success at
Chipotle?, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 2018, at B3 (“Instead of being the ugly
stepchild, Taco Bell became frequently cited as one of the top chains in the Yum
Brands empire, which also includes Pizza Hut and KFC.”); Gary Stoller, Hotel
Schools Are in With Inn Crowd, USA TODAY , Jan. 8, 2008, at 1B (“Hospitality schools
have long been regarded as the ugly stepchild on many campuses where teaching
students how to serve hotel and restaurant customers has been perceived as inferior
to other academic fields.”); Michael Upchurch, Real-Life Drama of Homicide Detectives,
WASH . POST, June 12, 2016, at B8 (quoting journalist Del Quentin Wilber for the
proposition that “[h]igh crime rates and underperforming schools have cast Prince
George’s County as the ugly stepchild of the Washington region”).
24
The U.S. Supreme Court held more than sixty years ago that obscenity is not
protected by the First Amendment’s guarantee of free speech. See Roth v. United
States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957) (holding that “obscenity is not within the area of
constitutionally protected speech or press”). The current three-part test for obscenity,
which was fashioned forty-five years ago, asks the factfinder to decide if the content
at issue: (1) appeals to a prurient interest in sex, when taken as a whole and as judged
by contemporary community standards from the perspective of the average person;
(2) is patently offensive, as defined by state law; and (3) “lacks serious literary,
artistic, political or scientific value.” Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973).
25
The U.S. Supreme Court first upheld the FCC’s regulatory authority over indecent
speech in the face of a First Amendment challenge in 1978. FCC v. Pacifica Found.
438 U.S. 726, 728 (1978) (holding that “§ 326 does not limit the Commission’s
authority to impose sanctions on licensees who engage in obscene, indecent, or
profane broadcasting”). The Court there confronted the issue of “whether the
Federal Communications Commission has any power to regulate a radio broadcast
that is indecent but not obscene.” Id. at 729. The Court concluded that the First
Amendment does not bar the FCC from regulating indecent speech in particular
contexts and circumstances, such as the time of day and composition of the
audience, when it would constitute a nuisance. Id. at 750–51. In reaching its
decision, the Court emphasized that “broadcast media have established a uniquely
pervasive presence in the lives of all Americans.” Id. at 748. It also focused on the
fact that “broadcasting is uniquely accessible to children, even those too young to
read.” Id. at 749. On this latter factor, the Court noted that indecent language on the
broadcast airwaves can “enlarge[] a child’s vocabulary in an instant.” Id.
In 2012, the Supreme Court passed on an opportunity to reconsider its holding in
Pacifica Foundation, finding it “unnecessary . . . to address the constitutionality of the
current indecency policy.” FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 567 U.S. 239, 258
(2012). The Court advised the FCC, however, that it was “free to modify its
current indecency policy in light of its determination of the public interest and
applicable legal requirements.” Id. at 259. In brief, the Court in Fox Television Stations
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FCC’s power over, or its current definition of, profane language.
Scholarly articles concentrating on the FCC’s definition of
profanity, in turn, are scant and now dated. 26
This Article examines the FCC’s problematic efforts to
conceptualize profane language since it abruptly announced in
2004 it would no longer “limit its definition of profane speech to
only those words and phrases that contain an element of
blasphemy or divine imprecation . . . .” 27 Blasphemy “is
generally defined as the act of insulting or showing contempt or
a lack of reverence for God or something considered sacred.” 28
To paraphrase a song title by the band R.E.M., the FCC’s
definition of profane language lost its religion fifteen years ago. 29
That switch was somewhat odd, at least at first blush,
because the historical nexus between profanity and blasphemy is
longstanding. 30 For example, the Supreme Court of South
Carolina noted more than a century ago that “profane language
is language irreverent toward God or holy things.” 31 In 1931, the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit found that
irreverently using the phrase “By God” 32 and calling “down the
curse of God upon certain individuals” 33 during a radio
broadcast constituted “profane language within the meaning of

in 2012 “sidestepped the longstanding question of whether the First Amendment,
given today’s multifaceted media landscape, no longer permits the Federal
Communications Commission to regulate broadcast indecency on the nation’s
airwaves.” Robert D. Richards & David J. Weinert, Punting in the First Amendment’s
Red Zone: The Supreme Court’s “Indecision” on the FCC’s Indecency Regulations Leaves
Broadcasters Still Searching for Answers, 76 A LB . L. REV . 631, 631 (2012).
26
See, e.g., Keith Brown & Adam Candeub, The Law and Economics of Wardrobe
Malfunction, 2005 BYU L. REV . 1463, 1496–98 (2005) (addressing the FCC’s
decision to expand its definition of profane language and calling the Commission’s
action an “aggressive interpretation” of its statutory authority); Edward L. Carter et
al., Broadcast Profanity and the “Right to Be Let Alone”: Can the FCC Regulate NonIndecent Fleeting Expletives Under a Privacy Model?, 31 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J.
1, 46 (2008) (providing a dated but excellent review of the FCC’s regulation of
profane language through 2008, and arguing that “the FCC could, without offending
the Constitution, directly regulate profanity as one of the objects of Congressional
intent in 18 U.S.C. § 1464”).
27
In re Complaints Against Various Broad. Licensees Regarding Their Airing of the
“Golden Globe Awards” Program, 19 FCC Rcd. 4975, 4981 (2004) [hereinafter
Golden Globe Awards II].
28
Kalman v. Cortes, 723 F. Supp. 2d 766, 770 (E.D. Pa. 2010).
29
R.E.M., LOSING MY RELIGION (Warner Brothers 1991).
30
The Supreme Court of Florida observed in 1944 that practically all of the state
courts of last resort that had considered the meaning of profanity “define it as the use
of words importing ‘an imprecation of Divine vengeance,’ of ‘implying Divine
condemnation,’ or words denoting ‘irreverence of God and holy things,’—
blasphemous.” Cason v. Baskin, 20 So. 2d 243, 247 (Fla. 1944). See also Carter et al.,
supra note 26, at 3–4 (noting that the Latin roots of “profane” carry a “blasphemyrelated meaning”).
31
City of Georgetown v. Scurry, 73 S.E. 353, 354 (S.C. 1912).
32
Duncan v. United States, 48 F.2d 128, 134 (9th Cir. 1931).
33
Id.
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that term as used in the act of Congress prohibiting the use of
profane language in radio broadcasting.” 34
But, as author S.E. Hinton might put it, that was then,
this is now. 35 Today, the FCC defines profane language on its
website as “‘grossly offensive’ language that is considered a
public nuisance.” 36 Might Howard Stern’s utterance of “fuck” on
the Good Morning America segment mentioned earlier meet this
definition? 37 And what about an over-the-air radio or television
station that uses the word “shithole” as allegedly uttered by
President Donald J. Trump in early 2018 to describe Haiti and
African countries whose citizens immigrate to the United
States? 38
This definition of profane language, untethered from its
religious roots, lingers today in a bizarre state of legal limbo. In
2007, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit declared
the FCC’s 2004 secularized approach to profane language
invalid under the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”). 39 The
court’s holding was due to the Commission’s failure to offer any
“independent reasons that would justify its newly-expanded
definition of ‘profane’ speech, aside from merely stating that its
prior precedent does not prevent it from setting forth a new
definition.” 40 But in 2009, the Supreme Court reversed that
decision in FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc. 41
On remand to the Second Circuit, the FCC abandoned its
contention that the broadcasts at issue were profane, thus
depriving the Second Circuit in 2010 of another opportunity to

34

Id. When Duncan was decided, the relevant legislation was Section 29 of the Radio
Act of 1927, which provided, in pertinent part, that “[n]o person within the
jurisdiction of the United States shall utter any obscene, indecent, or profane
language by means of radio communication.” Id. at 129. The enforcing authority, in
turn, was the Federal Radio Commission, the forerunner agency to the FCC. See
Gen. Elec. Co. v. FRC, 31 F.2d 630, 631–32 (1929) (“The act established the Federal
Radio Commission, with power . . . to make such regulations not inconsistent with
law.”).
35
S.E. H INTON, THAT WAS THEN, THIS IS NOW (1971).
36
Obscene, Indecent and Profane Broadcasts, FED. COMM. COMMISSION,
https://www.fcc.gov/consumers/guides/obscene-indecent-and-profane-broadcasts
(last updated Sept. 17, 2017).
37
See Eggerton, supra note 6 (addressing the Good Morning America segment described
here).
38
See John Hendel, Trump ‘Shithole’ Coverage Prompted More Than 160 Indecency
Complaints, POLITICO (Apr. 3, 2018),
https://www.politico.com/story/2018/04/03/trump-shithole-media-coverageindecency-complaints-454928.
39
Administrative Procedure Act, ch. 324, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified as amended at
5 U.S.C. §§551–559, 701–706 (2012)); see Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 489
F.3d 444, 461 (2d Cir. 2007), rev’d, 556 U.S. 502 (2009).
40
Fox Television Stations, 489 F.3d at 461.
41
556 U.S. 502, 530 (2009).
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address the profanity issue. 42 This suggested, at least to one First
Amendment scholar, that the FCC “appeared to have retired
profanity as an independent category for indecency violations.” 43
“Appeared” is the operative word in that last sentence.
This is because: (1) the FCC continues in 2019 to identify and
define profane language on its website as a brand of speech over
which it possesses authority; 44 (2) the FCC’s statutory power
over profane language remains on the federal code books; 45 and
(3) the FCC, in fact, still considers if content is profane when
asked to do so.
For example, in December 2014, the FCC “reject[ed] the
argument that the word ‘Redskins’ falls within the Commission’s
definition of profanity.” 46 In doing so, the Commission simply
reasoned that its definition of profanity does not stretch to racial
or religious epithets. 47 Remarkably, the FCC offered no
clarification of what its definition of profane language is. 48 In
brief, the Commission merely defined profanity in the negative
by stating what profane language is not. 49 In March 2015, the
Commission made a point of noting that “[e]nforcing the statute
and Rule restricting indecent, obscene, or profane broadcasts is an
important part of the Commission’s overall responsibility for
regulating broadcast radio and television operations.” 50
Despite such relatively recent indications that the FCC’s
consideration of profane language is alive and well, it has not
issued a single Notice of Apparent Liability for profanity (in
contrast to indecency) since the Second Circuit decision in 2007
42

Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 613 F.3d 317, 327, n.7 (2d Cir. 2010),
vacated, 567 U.S. 239 (2012).
43
Lili Levi, “Smut and Nothing But”: The FCC, Indecency, and Regulatory
Transformations in the Shadows, 65 ADMIN. L. REV . 509, 547 n.160 (2013).
44
See Obscene, Indecent and Profane Broadcasts, supra note 36 (providing a link to the
FCC’s current articulation of profane language).
45
See 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (2012).
46
Red Zebra Broad., 29 FCC Rcd. 15495, 15497 (2014).
47
Id.
48
See id. (noting only that the Second Circuit in 2007 had invalidated its secularized
and offensiveness-based nuisance definition that the FCC was confining to words
involve a sexual or excretory meaning).
49
The FCC explained in Red Zebra:
While the Commission has “recognize[d] that
additional words, such as language conveying
racial or religious epithets, are considered
offensive by most Americans,” it made clear its
intent “to avoid extending the bounds of
profanity to reach such language given
constitutional considerations.” Accordingly,
we reject the argument that the word
“Redskins” falls within the Commission’s
definition of profanity.
Id. (internal citation omitted).
50
In the Matter of WDBJ Television, Inc., 30 FCC Rcd. 3024, 3027 (2015)
(emphasis added).
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declared the Commission’s definition invalid under the APA. 51
In fact, with the exception of one high-profile incident in which
it found in 2015 that a newscast briefly showing an erect penis
was indecent, 52 the FCC has been largely dormant 53 in
penalizing obscene, indecent and profane content since the
Supreme Court invited it “to modify its current indecency policy
in light of its determination of the public interest and applicable
legal requirements.” 54 In a variation of the parlor game of
guessing whether a former celebrity is dead or alive, 55 one might
reasonably wonder today if the FCC’s policing of profane
language is dead, dying, or dormant.
Sadly, all of this confusion and consternation easily could
have been avoided and the answer could be a definitive “dead.”
That is because, as described later, 56 the FCC asked Congress in
1976 to eliminate its statutory power over profane language due
to some of the same issues that now crop up in 2019. Congress,
however, failed to heed the FCC’s recommendation, as
evidenced by the presence today of the “profane language”
clause in 18 U.S.C. § 1464. 57
To further explore and unpack this muddle, Part I reviews
several key judicial opinions involving profane language. 58 Part
II then examines the FCC’s March 2004 decision to change its
definition of profane language, contextualizing that shift within
the framework of a moral panic highlighted by the Super Bowl
halftime show featuring Janet Jackson just one month earlier. 59
Next, Part III analyzes several problems with the FCC’s current
definition of profane language, including its susceptibility to
challenges under the vagueness and overbreadth doctrines, as
well as its direct contravention of the general First Amendment
51

Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 489 F.3d 444, 461 (2d Cir. 2007), rev’d, 556
U.S. 502 (2009).
52
See generally WDBJ, 30 FCC Rcd. 3024; Clay Calvert et al., Indecency Four Years
After Fox Television Stations: From Big Papi to a Porn Star, an Egregious Mess at the FCC
Continues, 51 U. RICH. L. REV. 329 (2017) (criticizing the FCC’s Notice of Apparent
Liability for Forfeiture issued against WDBJ Television, Inc.).
53
The word “largely” is purposefully chosen because the FCC has issued a few
orders regarding indecency in the past half-dozen years. See Border Media Bus. Tr.,
29 FCC Rcd. 9488, 9489 (2014) (involving a $37,500 settlement over indecency
allegations stemming from a radio broadcast); KRXA, LLC., 29 FCC Rcd. 3482,
3487 (2014) (involving a $15,000 settlement over allegations involving violations of
both sponsorship identification and indecency regulations); Liberman Broad. Inc., 28
FCC Rcd. 15397, 15404 (2013).
54
FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 567 U.S. 239, 259 (2012).
55
See, e.g., Erin Chack, Quiz: Is This Celebrity Dead or Alive?, BUZZ FEED (Aug. 22,
2013), https://www.buzzfeed.com/erinchack/quiz-is-this-celebrity-dead-or-alive.
56
Infra notes 318–328 and accompanying text.
57
18 U.S.C. § 1464 (2012) (“Whoever utters any obscene, indecent, or profane
language by means of radio communication shall be fined under this title or
imprisoned not more than two years, or both.”).
58
Infra Part I.
59
Infra Part II.
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rule against censoring speech merely because it offends. 60
Finally, Part IV concludes that Congress should repeal the FCC’s
statutory authority over profane language unless the FCC acts
immediately to redraft its definition in a more concise and
constitutional manner. 61
REGULATING THE PROFANE IN THE FACE OF THE FIRST
AMENDMENT: A PRIMER
In 1792, all fourteen states that had ratified the U.S.
Constitution “made either blasphemy or profanity, or both,
statutory crimes.” 62 That, of course, was more than 225 years
ago—long before the U.S. Supreme Court launched its modern
First Amendment free-speech jurisprudence “in the early
twentieth century” 63 with the case of Schenck v. United States 64 in
1919. 65
So, if it seems as if profanity is among the few categories
of speech not protected 66 by the First Amendment, then the likely
culprit is a “famous passage” 67 in the Supreme Court’s 1942
decision in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire. 68 There, the Court made
the “highly problematic assertion” 69 that:
[t]here are certain well-defined and
narrowly limited classes of speech,
the prevention and punishment of
which has never been thought to
raise any Constitutional problem.
60

Infra Part III.
Infra Part IV.
62
Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 482 (1957).
63
David S. Han, Middle-Value Speech, 91 S. CAL. L. REV . 65, 77 (2017).
64
249 U.S. 47 (1919).
65
See Alexander Tsesis, The Empirical Shortcomings of First Amendment Jurisprudence: A
Historical Perspective on the Power of Hate Speech, 40 SANTA CLARA L. REV . 729, 732
(2000) (“Modern First Amendment jurisprudence began with Schenck v. United
States.”).
66
See United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 717 (2012) (identifying categories of
unprotected expression as incitement to violence, obscenity, defamation, speech
integral to criminal conduct, fighting words, child pornography, fraud, true threats
and “speech presenting some grave and imminent threat the government has the
power to prevent”); Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 245–46 (2002)
(“The freedom of speech has its limits; it does not embrace certain categories of
speech, including defamation, incitement, obscenity, and pornography produced
with real children.”).
67
Michael J. Mannheimer, The Fighting Words Doctrine, 93 COLUM. L. REV . 1527,
1534 (1993).
68
315 U.S. 568 (1942).
69
Burton Caine, The Trouble With “Fighting Words”: Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire Is a
Threat to First Amendment Values and Should be Overruled, 88 M ARQ. L. REV . 441, 457
(2004). This passage is highly problematic because it “invented the theory that entire
categories of speech are denied First Amendment protection.” Id. at 456.
61
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These include the lewd and
obscene, the profane, the libelous,
and the insulting or “fighting”
words—those which by their very
utterance inflict injury or tend to
incite an immediate breach of the
peace. It has been well observed
that such utterances are no essential
part of any exposition of ideas, and
are of such slight social value as a
step to truth that any benefit that
may be derived from them is clearly
outweighed by the social interest in
order and morality. 70
The above-quoted language is perhaps best known for
creating the “fighting words” exception to the First
Amendment. 71 It also was favorably cited by the Court in Roth v.
United States 72 to buttress the notion that obscenity falls outside
the ambit of First Amendment protection. 73 And, most
significantly for this Article, profane expression also is placed by
Chaplinsky among the “classes of speech as [falling] outside of the
First Amendment’s coverage.” 74
Yet, the passage is largely dicta. 75 Dicta, as Professor
Michael Dorf notes, “typically refers to statements in a judicial
opinion that are not necessary to support the decision reached by
the court.” 76 In other words, dicta are “comprised of statements

70

Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 571–72 (emphasis added).
William C. Nevin, “Fighting Slurs”: Contemporary Fighting Words and the Question of
Criminally Punishable Racial Epithets, 14 FIRST AMEND . L. REV . 127, 129 (2015)
(noting that Chaplinsky “established the ‘fighting words’ exception to the First
Amendment in American jurisprudence”); Robert M. O’Neil, Hate Speech, Fighting
Words, and Beyond—Why American Law Is Unique, 76 ALB. L. REV . 467, 472 (2012)
(observing that Chaplinsky “has been persistently cited with sufficient deference to
imply that uttering ‘fighting words’ remains a recognized exception to First
Amendment freedoms”).
72
354 U.S. 476 (1957).
73
Specifically, the Roth Court cited Chaplinksy, among other decisions, to support its
assertion that “numerous opinions indicate that this Court has always assumed that
obscenity is not protected by the freedoms of speech and press.” Id. at 481.
74
Rodney A. Smolla, Categories, Tiers of Review, and the Roiling Sea of Free Speech
Doctrine and Principle: A Methodological Critique of United States v. Alvarez, 76 A LB. L.
REV . 499, 500 (2012).
75
See P. Brooks Fuller, The Angry Pamphleteer: True Threats, Political Speech, and
Applying Watts v. United States in the Age of Twitter, 21 COMM . L. & POL’Y 87, 87
n.1 (“The Supreme Court of the United States outlined several categories of
unprotected speech under the First Amendment in dicta in Chaplinsky . . . .”) (citing
Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 571–72)).
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that do not constitute the court’s holdings.” 77 Chaplinksy’s
observation that profane language falls beyond the purview of
the First Amendment, therefore, is nonbinding.
The notion Chaplinsky carved out a new category
unprotected of speech for profane language—at least to the
extent that the term, as noted above, involved denigrating God
or religion 78 —was put to rest one decade later in Burstyn v.
Wilson. 79 There the Court considered the constitutionality of a
New York statute banning certain “motion picture films on the
ground they are ‘sacrilegious.’” 80 In declaring the law
unconstitutional, Justice Tom Clark wrote for the Court:
from the standpoint of freedom of
speech and the press, it is enough to
point out that the state has no
legitimate interest in protecting any
or all religions from views
distasteful to them which is
sufficient to justify prior restraints
upon the expression of those views.
It is not the business of government
in our nation to suppress real or
imagined attacks upon a particular
religious doctrine, whether they
appear in publications, speeches, or
motion pictures. 81
To the extent that profanity was stripped of its religious
connotations and now simply encompasses vulgar words that
might offend, the Supreme Court’s 1971 decision in Cohen v.
California affords First Amendment protection to such vulgar
language. 82 There the Court held government entities, “acting as
guardians of public morality,” 83 could not permissibly punish a
man for peacefully wearing a jacket emblazoned with words
“Fuck the Draft” in a Los Angeles courthouse. 84 In its opinion,
the Court noted that California “has no right to cleanse public
debate to the point where it is grammatically palatable to the
most squeamish among us.” 85 Intimating the vagueness issues
77

Lisa M. Durham Taylor, Parsing Supreme Court Dicta to Adjudicate Non-Workplace
Harms, 57 DRAKE L. REV . 75, 92 (2008).
78
See, e.g., Kalman v. Cortes, 723 F. Supp. 2d 766, 770 (E.D. Pa. 2010).
79
343 U.S. 495 (1952).
80
Id. at 497.
81
Id. at 505.
82
403 U.S. 15 (1971).
83
Id. at 22.
84
Id. at 15.
85
Id. at 25.
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plaguing the contested statute, which attempted to regulate
“offensive conduct,” 86 Justice John Marshall Harlan II reasoned
for the majority that:
while the particular four-letter word
being litigated here is perhaps more
distasteful than most others of its
genre, it is nevertheless often true
that one man’s vulgarity is
another’s lyric. Indeed, we think it
is largely because governmental
officials cannot make principled
distinctions in this area that the
Constitution leaves matters of taste
and style so largely to the
individual. 87
In a nutshell, the Court in Cohen gave First Amendment
protection to “the mother of all words commonly labeled lewd
or profane” in the years since Chaplinsky. 88 As Rodney Smolla
explains, “the fate of the ‘F Word,’ now constitutionally
protected in many circumstances notwithstanding Chaplinsky, is
one of many examples of Chaplinsky as an overstatement of
current outcomes in free speech cases.” 89
The bottom line today is that “profanity’s categorical
exclusion from the First Amendment is no more.” 90 In fact,
“[n]ot one of the Court’s opinions over the last half a century has
mentioned profane utterances as uncovered by the First
Amendment. Rather, profanity today is often protected from
government sanctions.” 91
Yet secularized profanity—profanity as a term for vulgar
curse words, regardless of any religious overtones or
implications—is not absolutely protected by the First
Amendment. It can still be regulated in specific circumstances,
such as when it is uttered by students in public high schools, 92
86

Id. at 16 n.1.
Id. at 25.
88
Smolla, supra note 74, at 501.
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Id. at 502.
90
Charles W. “Rocky” Rhodes, The First Amendment Structure for Speakers and Speech,
44 SETON HALL L. REV . 395, 412 (2014).
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See Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 678, 682 (1986) (upholding a
public high school student’s punishment for giving a speech that centered on “an
elaborate, graphic, and explicit sexual metaphor,” and distinguishing the Court’s
protection of profanity in Cohen v. California, by noting that “[i]t does not follow . . .
that simply because the use of an offensive form of expression may not be prohibited
to adults making what the speaker considers a political point, the same latitude must
be permitted to children in a public school”).
87
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when it rises to the level of fighting words 93 or when it targets
airline personnel in an intimidating fashion. 94
In the last category, consider a federal statute that
stipulates a punishment for “intimidating a flight crew member
or flight attendant of the aircraft.” 95 In United States v. Lynch, 96
an apparently intoxicated first-class passenger shouted “f[uck]
this airline” 97 and repeatedly yelled “f[uck] you, c[unt]” 98 after a
flight attendant stopped serving him alcoholic drinks. 99 In
upholding the passenger’s conviction under 49 U.S.C. § 46504,
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reasoned the
statute “sets out a content-neutral prohibition on conduct in a
specific time, place, and manner.” 100 The Court added: “nothing
in the statute prohibits profanity or any other content, per se.” 101
Anti-profanity statutes still exist. 102 Despite some
scholars’ contention that these laws are facially
unconstitutional, 103 they may be permissible if narrowly
construed to apply only to situations where profanities are
uttered as fighting words. 104 Fighting words are those involving
“a direct personal insult or an invitation to exchange
fisticuffs.” 105 As the Supreme Court wrote in Cohen v.
93

See Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 518 (1972) (affirming the unconstitutionality
of a statute targeting “opprobrious words or abusive language” because its scope was
not narrowed or limited in construction to fighting words scenarios). Anti-profanity
statutes, in turn, are sometimes deemed constitutional if they are narrowly construed
to apply only to fighting words scenarios. Johnson v. Quattlebaum, 664 F. App’x.
290, 291 (4th Cir. 2016). For instance, a South Carolina statute makes it a
misdemeanor to use “profane language on any highway or at any public place or
gathering or in hearing distance of any schoolhouse or church.” S.C. CODE A NN. §
16-17-530 (2018). In 2014, Krystal Johnson was prosecuted under the statute for
uttering the decidedly nonreligious-based phrase “[t]his is some motherfucking shit.”
Johnson, 664 F. App’x. at 291. The Fourth Circuit upheld the statute because a South
Carolina intermediate appellate court had construed it “to require fighting words for
a conviction.” Id. at 294.
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See United States v. Lynch, 881 F.3d 812 (10th Cir. 2018).
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881 F.3d 812 (10th Cir. 2018).
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See David L. Hudson Jr., Fighting Words: Can Anti-Profanity Laws and the Fighting
Words Doctrine Be Squared with the First Amendment?, 104 A.B.A. J. 18, 18 (2018).
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See id. (quoting Professor Jennifer Kinsley for the proposition that “laws banning
profanity are unconstitutional on their face” and for her observation that “[t]he sole
justification for these laws is morality-based, which the Supreme Court has held
insufficient to justify laws regulating fundamental rights”).
104
See id. (noting that “[t]he reason why such laws are sometimes considered
constitutional is the fighting words doctrine”); S.C. CODE A NN . § 16-17-530 (2018)
(providing an example an anti-profanity statute in South Carolina that was deemed
constitutional because, as judicially construed, it was limited in scope to fighting
words situations).
105
Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 409 (1989).
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California, 106 fighting words take the form of “a direct personal
insult” 107 and “personally abusive epithets which, when
addressed to the ordinary citizen, are, as a matter of common
knowledge, inherently likely to provoke violent reaction.” 108
Mental offense or discomfort sustained by hearing profanity, as
one federal district court recently observed, does not give rise to
a fighting words situation. 109
However, in the absence of either a statute such as the one
in Lynch 110 or a fighting words scenario, secular profanity uttered
by adults is generally protected by the First Amendment. For
instance, the Supreme Court of Connecticut recently tossed out
the breach-of-the-peace conviction of Nina Baccala for calling a
female supermarket manager “a ‘fat ugly bitch’ and a ‘cunt.’” 111
The Nutmeg State’s high court conceded that Baccala, a
customer, had “invoked one or more of the most vulgar terms
known in our lexicon” 112 to refer to the store manager’s gender.
Yet, the Court reasoned that, per the fighting words doctrine,
“[u]ttering a cruel or offensive word is not a crime unless it would
tend to provoke a reasonable person in the addressee’s position
to immediately retaliate with violence under the
circumstances.” 113 Baccala was protected, the Supreme Court of
Connecticut reasoned, because “the natural reaction of an
average person in [the store manager’s] position who is
confronted with a customer’s profane outburst, unaccompanied
by any threats, would not be to strike her.” 114
With this background on profanity rulings in mind, the
Article next turns to the FCC’s decision in 2004 to change its
definition of profane language and its subsequent effort in 2006
to refine that new definition. Part II contextualizes the
Commission’s decision within the framework of a moral panic
then facing the FCC.
106
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REFLECTING ON A M ORAL PANIC FIFTEEN YEARS
LATER: THE M OVE TO ALTER PROFANE LANGUAGE AT THE
FCC
Moral panics are “over-heated periods of intense
concern.” 115 They arise when many people harbor “intense
feelings of concern about a given threat which a sober assessment
of the evidence suggests is either nonexistent or considerably less
than would be expected from the concrete harm posed by the
threat.” 116 The concept was coined by British sociologist Stanley
Cohen more than forty-five years ago. 117 Central to a moral panic
is an “overreaction” 118 or “a highly exaggerated response to the
original negative event.” 119
Violence in movies, comic books, and video games has
sparked moral panics, resulting in censorship efforts. 120 For
example, the music of rapper Marshall Mathers, better known as
Eminem, spawned a moral panic more than fifteen years ago. 121
New forms of media that are alien to older adults trigger moral
panics. 122 Perhaps more than any variety of media content, it is
sexual expression that launches moral panics in the United
115

Erich Goode & Nachman Ben-Yehuda, Moral Panics: Culture, Politics, and Social
Construction, 20 A NN. REV . SOC . 149, 149 (1994).
116
Id.
117
Cohen explained that a moral panic occurs when:
[a] condition, episode, person or group of
persons emerges to become defined as a threat
to societal values and interests; its nature is
presented in a stylized and stereotypical
fashion by the mass media; the moral
barricades are manned by editors, bishops,
politicians and other right-thinking people;
socially accredited experts pronounce their
diagnoses and solutions; ways of coping are
evolved or (more often) resorted to; the
condition then disappears, submerges or
deteriorates and becomes more visible.
STANLEY COHEN, F OLK DEVILS AND M ORAL PANICS: THE CREATION OF M ODS
AND R OCKERS 1 (Routledge Classics 2011) (1972).
118
Carol A. Stabile, Conspiracy or Consensus? Reconsidering the Moral Panic, 25 J.
COMM. I NQUIRY 258, 259 (2001).
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Perry Howell, Early Radio News and the Origins of the Risk Society, 10 RADIO J. 131,
138 (2012).
120
See William E. Lee, Books, Video Games, and Foul-Mouthed Hollywood Glitteratae:
The Supreme Court and the Technology-Neutral Interpretation of the First Amendment, 14
COLUM. SCI. & TECH . L. REV . 295, 352 (2013).
121
See Gilbert B. Rodman, Race . . . and Other Four Letter Words: Eminem and Cultural
Politics of Authenticity, 4 POPULAR COMM. 95, 99 (2006) (noting “the midst of the
moral panic that surround[ed] Eminem”).
122
See Christopher J. Ferguson & John Colwell, Understanding Why Scholars Hold
Different Views on the Influences of Video Games on Public Health, 67 J. COMM. 305, 310
(2017) (“Moral panics often focus on newer forms of media that may not yet have
been embraced by large swaths of society, particularly older adults. As a key element,
a negative social narrative forms about this new media, initially based on moral
repugnance, rather than data.”).
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States. The country, as Professor Bruce Burgett observes, “has
been characterized from the outset as . . . shaped through a
history of recurring sex panics.” 123 That remains true today. For
example, concern over teen sexting 124 a few years ago constituted
a moral panic. 125 And consistent with all moral panics that
“eventually fade,” 126 Professor Kimberlianne Podlas notes “it
appears the moral panic about teen sexting has faded. Reporting
on teen sexting had declined significantly.” 127
What are the key ingredients of moral panics? First, the
media generally play a major role in fanning the flames of fright,
be it intentionally or otherwise. 128 As a 2016 article in Journalism
Practice notes, “[j]ournalists and the media outlets they work for
can contribute to moral panic by exaggerating events, publishing
unsubstantiated claims, or giving preference to certain groups or
individuals and ignoring others.” 129 Second, the role of interest
groups is important, with one article noting that a moral panic
involves “the unanticipated and unintended outcome of moral
crusades undertaken by particular interest groups (e.g.,
professional associations, the police, parent organizations) in an
effort to draw public attention to, and curtail, a specific set of
actions.” 130 Other key players in moral panics include “the
politicians, the experts, and the legislators.” 131 Third, “moral
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practice, seem to have become a goal.”).
129
Tom Morton & Eurydice Aroney, Journalism, Moral Panic and the Public Interest, 10
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panics often emanate from a key event.” 132 All of these factors
may coalesce to produce a response from the legal system. 133
This Article argues that a slowly simmering moral panic
over racy broadcast content suddenly boiled over with a single
event—the CBS-televised, MTV-produced halftime show of
Super Bowl XXXVIII on February 1, 2004, featuring the
uncovering of singer Janet Jackson’s right breast by Justin
Timberlake. 134 The very next month, the FCC radically changed
and expanded its definition of profane language in pro-censorial
fashion. 135
The game was watched by approximately ninety million
people and, perhaps more importantly from a moral panic
perspective, “as many as one in five American kids between the
ages of 2 and 11 years caught that halftime show.” 136 In vivid
color, they witnessed Timberlake, reaching across Jackson’s
“chest, pulling off the right cup of her bodice – which clearly was
designed to break away easily, like a nursing bra, only black and
with metal studs and rivets – and revealing her breast, which was
adorned with a silver ‘nipple guard.’” 137 In brief, the halftime
show’s “wardrobe malfunction,” 138 as Timberlake termed it,
likely spawned the FCC’s definitional malfunction on profane
language.
Professor Jeremy Harris Lipschultz notes that the Janet
Jackson incident “sparked numerous calls for media decency in
the United States.” 139 However, problems were already festering
132

Bryan E. Denham, Folk Devils, News Icons and the Construction of Moral Panics:
Heroin Chic and the Amplification of Drug Threats in Contemporary Society, 9
JOURNALISM STUD . 945, 946–47 (2008).
133
See Stabile, supra note 118, at 259 (“Rumor, mass media hype, and the
institutional response to these cause people to panic about crime, which in turn
causes them to support more stringent law and order measures.”).
134
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TODAY , Feb. 2, 2004, at 1C (reporting that “singer Janet Jackson’s breast was
exposed on national TV during the Super Bowl XXXVIII halftime show,” and
quoting an MTV statement for the proposition that “[t]he tearing of Janet Jackson’s
costume was unrehearsed, unplanned, completely unintentional and was inconsistent
with assurances we had about the content of the performance”); Daman Hack,
Patriots Win 2nd Super Bowl in 3 Years, N.Y. T IMES, Feb. 2, 2004, at A1 (reporting
that “Janet Jackson’s right breast was exposed at the end of her duet with Justin
Timberlake when he pulled off part of her top”).
135
The FCC’s March 2004 change of its enforcement policy regarding indecency and
its conceptualization of profane language are discussed later in this section. See
generally Golden Globe Awards II, 19 FCC Rcd. 4975 (2004).
136
Lisa de Moraes, CBS Gave 90 Million an Eyeful, WASH . P OST, Feb. 3, 2004, at C1.
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Video Review, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2, 2004, at D4 (“Timberlake released a statement,
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with broadcast content before the “wardrobe malfunction.” As
Ann Oldenburg summed it up in USA Today, “[t]hough
television has been pushing the sexual-innuendo envelope for
decades, this flash of breast, on national television during a
beloved annual sporting event seen by millions of families,
suddenly became a culminating moment in a long-simmering
culture clash.” 140 Thus, while Jackson’s breast-baring was “[t]he
flashpoint for conservative critics” 141 over televised indecency,
trouble had been brewing with salty language and racy images
on the broadcast airwaves in the two years immediately before
it.
For example, during her acceptance speech at the
Billboard Music Awards in 2002, singer and movie star Cher
proclaimed she “had my critics for the last forty years saying that
I was on my way out every year. Right. So f*** ’em.” 142 Her
words were broadcast on Fox network stations. 143 In 2003, when
the Billboard Music Awards were again broadcast on Fox,
reality-television personality Nicole Richie queried before
presenting an award, “[h]ave you ever tried to get cow shit out
of a Prada purse? It’s not so fucking simple.” 144 Additionally that
year, ABC television stations aired an episode of NYPD Blue that
“showed the nude buttocks of an adult female character for
approximately seven seconds and for a moment the side of her
breast.” 145 Furthermore, during an acceptance speech at the 2003
Golden Globe Awards show on NBC, singer Bono of the Irish
band U2 uttered the phrase “really, really, fucking brilliant.” 146
And finally, just one week before the Janet Jackson fiasco,
actress Diane Keaton said “shit” during a speech at the 2004
Golden Globes Award show. 147
It was these incidents that both primed the pump for the
moral panic 148 and later provided the FCC with the vehicle for
140
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141
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See Chuck Barney, Super Bowl Furor Fuels Culture War, CONTRA COSTA T IMES
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changing its definition of profane language in March 2004. 149
Bono’s speech gave the public, as well as crusading interest
groups such as the Parents Television Council, 150 a propitious
opportunity to apply enhanced pressure on the FCC to better
police the broadcast airwaves in the months leading up to the
halftime show at Super Bowl XXXVIII.
That is because in October 2003, David Solomon, chief
of the FCC’s Enforcement Bureau, concluded that Bono’s
statement “really, really, fucking brilliant” was not indecent. 151
The FCC’s definition of indecency requires that speech “depicts
or describes sexual or excretory activities or organs in terms
patently offensive as measured by contemporary community
standards for the broadcast medium.” 152 Solomon reasoned that
Bono’s deployment of “fucking” was not indecent because it
“did not describe sexual or excretory organs or activities. Rather,
the performer used the word ‘fucking’ as an adjective or expletive
to emphasize an exclamation.” 153 Solomon, however, did not
consider whether the language was profane; he found only it was
neither indecent nor obscene. 154
The decision, as Frank Ahrens wrote in the Washington
Post, “was criticized and derided.” 155 Multiple members of the
U.S. Senate proposed a resolution condemning it. 156 The ruling
also “elicited strong opposition from the Parents Television
Council.” 157 Professor Ira Robbins, in fact, contends it was the
PTC that “convinced the Commission to review the decision.” 158
Indeed, as one article noted in December 2003,
Solomon’s conclusion did not sit “well with some, from the
Parents Television Council (which organized most of the Bono
complaints) to congressmen to FCC Chairman Michael Powell
himself, who played no part in the ruling and deemed it
‘reprehensible’ that children might hear the F-word in any form
on the air.” 159 Powell, in fact, reportedly circulated a draft
proposal in January 2004 designed to overturn Solomon’s
149
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decision. 160 During a talk that same month at the National Press
Club in Washington, D.C., Powell called it “irresponsible for our
programmers to continue to try to push the envelope on a
reasonable set of policies that try to legitimately balance the
interests of the First Amendment with a need to protect our
kids.” 161 Even Comedy Central’s animated show South Park
spoofed Solomon’s decision in an episode in which students are
puzzled as “a teacher is shown saying that students can use a
common swear word ‘only in the figurative noun form or the
adjective form.’” 162
While the October 2003 Bono ruling garnered the
attention of FCC commissioners, Congress and the PTC, it was
the February 1, 2004 airing of the Super Bowl halftime show that
got “seemingly all of America” 163 contemplating what it means
to go too far in airing explicit content. Indeed, “callers flooded
CBS affiliate offices with complaints” 164 the same night the game
aired.
As Frank Rich of the New York Times waggishly summed
it up, “Janet Jackson’s breast (not even the matched set!) would
lead to one of the most hysterical outbreaks of Puritanism in
recent, even not-so-recent, American history.” 165 In a nutshell, if
the October 2003 ruling by Solomon on Bono’s exclamation lit
the kindling, then “Janet Jackson’s Super Bowl exposure poured
more fuel on the fire.” 166 The latter incident, simply put,
“brought indecency to the center of the national political
discussion.” 167
In accord with the notion that moral panics feature
interest groups on crusades, 168 the one sparked by Janet Jackson
involved the Parents Television Council. As media defense
attorney Robert Corn-Revere writes, “policy entrepreneurs like
Brent Bozell, who then led the Parents Television Council – and
the FCC – immediately pounced on the 9/16-second flash of
bejeweled breast flesh as a sign of the End of Days and a call to

160
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arms.” 169 Indeed, just days after the Super Bowl incident, Bozell
stated: “[w]e do not accept the apology of CBS, nor do we accept
the statements of regret by MTV. . . It is absolutely reckless for
CBS to claim it had no prior knowledge that such activity was
likely to take place.” 170
FCC chairman Michael Powell immediately declared
being “outraged at what I saw” 171 during the Super Bowl, adding
that “[o]ur nation’s children, parents and citizens deserve
better.” 172 He announced the FCC would investigate the halftime
show, 173 dubbing it “a classless, crass and deplorable stunt.” 174
The halftime-show incident also fits neatly within the
framework of a moral panic because, as Erich Goode and
Nachman Ben-Yehuda point out, “many moral panics are about
sex.” 175 Indeed, Janet Jackson and Justin Timberlake certainly
served up a saucy, sexually-charged performance.
With panic swirling, the FCC on March 18, 2004—less
than seven weeks after Super Bowl XXXVIII—reversed the
Enforcement Bureau’s October 2003 indecency ruling regarding
Bono’s acceptance speech. 176 Specifically on the indecency issue,
all five commissioners concluded that: (1) Bono’s speech “is
within the scope of our indecency definition because it does
depict or describe sexual activities;” 177 (2) any variation of “fuck”
used in any context “inherently has a sexual connotation;” 178 (3)
it is irrelevant in an indecency determination that a network did
not intend to broadcast the language; 179 and (4) “the mere fact
that specific words or phrases are not sustained or repeated does
not mandate a finding that material that is otherwise patently
offensive to the broadcast medium is not indecent.” 180
But more significantly for purposes of this Article, the
FCC did not end its review there. It also decided to address,
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independent from its indecency determination, 181 whether
Bono’s speech was profane under 18 U.S.C. § 1464. As noted
earlier, Enforcement Bureau Chief David Solomon never
considered the profane-language issue in his October 2003
ruling, having only analyzed questions of indecency and
obscenity. 182 But that did not prevent the Commission from
considering the issue sua sponte the month following the Super
Bowl halftime show debacle.
In particular, the Commission in March 2004
acknowledged its “limited case law on profane speech has
focused on what is profane in the context of blasphemy.” 183 It
told broadcasters, however, they were now “on notice that the
Commission in the future will not limit its definition of profane
speech to only those words and phrases that contain an element
of blasphemy or divine imprecation.” 184 The Commission
asserted it was free to expand its definition because none of its
prior cases suggested “that the statutory definition of profane is
limited to blasphemy.” 185 It also cited favorably the U.S. Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals’ 1972 decision in Tallman v. United
States. 186 The Seventh Circuit there opined that profane can be
understood as “denoting language which under contemporary
community standards is so grossly offensive to members of the
public who actually hear it as to amount to a nuisance.” 187 The
Commission in March 2004 reasoned that there was nothing in
its prior case law regarding profane language that held it “could
not also apply the definition articulated by the Seventh
Circuit” 188 in Tallman thirty-two years earlier.
So, what precisely would constitute profane language
going forward? Unfortunately, the FCC “did not provide specific
guidance for its new definition of profanity.” 189 It merely
announced profane language would now include not only
“fuck,” but also “words (or variants thereof) that are as highly
offensive as” 190 it when “broadcast between 6 a.m. and 10
p.m.” 191 and “depending on the context.” 192
181
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It was not until March 2006 that the Commission offered
up its own definition of profane language. 193 In considering
multiple cases involving alleged broadcast indecency and
profanity, the Commission announced that “as a general matter,
we will analyze potentially profane language with respect to
whether it is ‘so grossly offensive as to constitute a nuisance.’” 194 It
drew part of that italicized language from the decades-old,
Seventh Circuit decision in Tallman noted earlier. 195
The Commission also concluded that some words are
presumptively profane. 196 The presumption, it noted, applies
only to “the most offensive words in the English language, the
broadcast of which are likely to shock the viewer and disturb the
peace and quiet of the home.” 197
The Commission added, however, that even
presumptively profane language may be protected in “rare
cases.” 198 These include scenarios where the language “is
demonstrably essential to the nature of an artistic or educational
work or essential to informing viewers on a matter of public
importance.” 199 It also explained that the written word “fuck” is
protected when it appears so briefly on screen that it “would not
have been noticed by the average viewer.” 200 In summary, the
presumption that certain words are profane is rebuttable in
special circumstances.
What words are presumptively profane? “Fuck” and
“shit.” Specifically, the Commission wrote that “fuck” is “a
vulgar sexual term so grossly offensive to members of the
public that it amounts to a nuisance and is presumptively
profane. It is one of the most offensive words in the English
language, the broadcast of which is likely to shock the viewer and
disturb the peace and quiet of the home.” 201 It concluded that
“shit” also fits this same definition, 202 adding that it “invariably
invokes a coarse excretory image.” 203
Significantly, the Commission in 2006 also attempted to
somewhat confine the scope of its new profanity definition by
adopting “a presumption that our regulation of profane language
193
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will be limited to the universe of words that are sexual or
excretory in nature or are derived from such terms.” 204 It thus
found words such as “bitch,” “hell,” and “damn,” as well as
variants thereof, are not presumed to be profane. 205 While the
words “ass” and “piss” “do describe sexual or excretory
activities,” 206 they are not presumptively profane but may fall
within the definition of profane language depending on the
context in which they are used. 207
The problem, however, with this sexual-or-excretory
limitation on profane language is that it duplicates the
Commission’s definition of indecency, which also requires that
the words or images in question “describe or depict sexual or
excretory organs or activities.” 208 Indecency and profanity
become redundant. Finally, the Commission in 2006 suggested
that its use of “nuisance” within its new definition of profane
language was on “sound constitutional footing” 209 because the
U.S. Supreme Court upheld the Commission’s reliance on a
nuisance rationale in approving its authority over indecent
content. 210
The Commission’s 2006 ruling was the last time it
attempted to offer a definition and clarify the meaning of profane
language after it decided to expand that concept in its 2004 Bono
ruling. As noted earlier, 211 the Second Circuit in 2007 struck
down the FCC’s changes to profane language as unsupported
under the Administrative Procedure Act, but the Supreme Court
later reversed the Second Circuit’s opinion and on remand the
FCC did not pursue a profane-language theory. That left the
FCC’s definition of profane language in a state of legal limbo. 212
If moral panics involve “exaggerated responses to deviant
213
acts,”
then the FCC’s decision to radically alter its
conceptualization of profane language in March 2004 was an
exaggerated response to a deviant act of breast-baring witnessed
204
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by kids. 214 Reconsideration of the Bono incident simply afforded
the Commission a ready-made opportunity to quickly prove its
mettle to the public and to the Parents Television Council that it
would aggressively police the airwaves after the Super Bowl and,
in turn, restore the moral and social order. The FCC’s reaction
to the one-two punch combination of Bono and Janet Jackson
thus fits snugly within the notion that the response to threats
sparking moral panics “is likely to be a demand for greater social
regulation or control and a demand for a return to ‘traditional’
values.” 215
The FCC’s March 2004 decision broadening its definition
of profane language was an overreaction in the immediate
aftermath of the Janet Jackson incident. The Commission, as
noted above, adjusted its indecency policy in that same ruling to
reach unintentional and fleeting instances of sexual content in
the future. 216 It thus already had at its disposal regulatory power
over indecency sufficient to punish broadcasters for fleeting and
supposedly unscripted instances of sexual content on the
airwaves. It simply did not need to alter its definition of profane
language to do so. Expanding the definition of profane language
thus amounted to agency overkill.
Ultimately, the reaction to the Janet Jackson incident falls
in line with what Robert Corn-Revere calls “a historical context
of successive panics about the latest scourge affecting our
children.” 217 And, consistent with the pattern that moral panics
disappear, 218 Professor Lipschultz observes that “[t]he furor that
was the post-Janet Jackson 2004 Super Bowl era had calmed by
2006.” 219
What remains more than a decade later, however, is a
muddle regarding profanity. It is a muddle provoked by a “less
than one-second baring” 220 of a breast—more precisely, “ninesixteenths of one second” 221—and created in the crucible of an
awards show containing a single, unscripted expletive uttered by
an Irish singer. In brief, the moral panic may have died, but its
lugubrious legacy—a troubling FCC conceptualization of
profane language that is questionable under the First
214
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Amendment—lingers on. Key flaws with that conceptualization
are addressed in the next part.
A FATALLY FLAWED EFFORT TO RESTRICT SPEECH:
ANALYZING PROBLEMS WITH THE FCC’S DEFINITION OF
PROFANE LANGUAGE
This Part has two sections, each concentrating on a
different weakness or defect with the FCC’s definition of profane
language. Initially, Section A analyzes problems with the
definition under both the void-for-vagueness and overbreadth
doctrines. 222 Section B then explores how the Supreme Court’s
reenergized defense of offensive expression in recent cases
hammers another metaphorical nail into the legal coffin of
profane language at the FCC. 223
A. Vagueness and Overbreadth Challenges
The FCC’s definition of profane language articulated
today on its website is readily susceptible to facial challenges for
both vagueness and overbreadth. This section initially analyzes
that definition for vagueness problems. It then examines
overbreadth issues. Importantly, these issues were never
addressed by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in
its now-overruled 2007 decision in Fox Television Stations, Inc. v.
FCC. 224 The Second Circuit merely held that, under the
Administrative Procedure Act, the FCC had failed to provide a
reasoned analysis sufficient to justify changing its definition of
profane language. 225
Under the void for vagueness doctrine, as Professor
Cristina Lockwood notes, “the Court’s concern has been
whether the law at issue provides notice of what it allows or
prohibits.” 226 Thus, as Frank LoMonte explains, “[a] regulation
may be declared void for vagueness if it fails to give intelligible
notice of the behavior that will result in penalties.” 227 Vague laws
are therefore dangerous largely because “the uncertainty
regarding how a speech regulation will be applied . . . creates a
basis for self-censorship.” 228 Self-censorship is tantamount to a
chilling effect on speech under which individuals voluntarily
222
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silence themselves due to the fear of prosecution or liability based
upon what they otherwise might say. 229
In addition to fostering self-censorship, vague laws are
problematic because they give too much leeway to those charged
with enforcing them and thus can be applied unfairly and
unevenly. As the Supreme Court wrote in 2018, the vagueness
“doctrine guards against arbitrary or discriminatory law
enforcement by insisting that a statute provide standards to
govern the actions of police officers, prosecutors, juries, and
judges.” 230
In brief, as the Court put it in 2012 when examining the
FCC’s regulation of broadcast indecency, due process “requires
the invalidation of laws that are impermissibly vague.” 231 It went
on to say that “the void for vagueness doctrine addresses at least
two connected but discrete due process concerns: first, that
regulated parties should know what is required of them so they
may act accordingly; second, precision and guidance are
necessary so that those enforcing the law do not act in an
arbitrary or discriminatory way.” 232 The Court added that
“[w]hen speech is involved, rigorous adherence to those
requirements is necessary to ensure that ambiguity does not chill
protected speech.” 233
A law thus will be declared unconstitutionally vague if it
“fails to provide a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice of
what is prohibited, or is so standardless that it authorizes or
encourages seriously discriminatory enforcement.” 234 The key is
that a law must provide “the person of ordinary intelligence a
reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited, so that he
may act accordingly.” 235
Is the FCC’s current definition of profane language
unconstitutionally vague under these principles? The
Commission defines profane language today on its website as
“‘grossly offensive’ language that is considered a public
nuisance.” 236 Although that definition is concise in terms of
brevity, problems abound. First, the FCC offers no guidance on
what it means by “offensive.” Second, it provides no description
of what it means by “grossly.” Third, it is hard to fathom how
229
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using the word “grossly” to modify “offensive” adds clarity for a
broadcaster seeking guidance and fair notice on how to avoid a
possible civil penalty for airing profane content. All “grossly”
does is ratchet up the level of offensiveness, but to an unspecified
and nebulous degree. Modifying “offensive” with “grossly” thus
does nothing to save the FCC’s definition from vagueness
problems. The FCC’s use of “grossly” hearkens back to, at least
in the author’s mind, a humorous scene from the movie A Few
Good Men. 237 There, Lieutenant Commander Joanne Galloway
futilely adds the word “strenuously” to modify the word “object”
after her initial objection to a judge is overruled. A flippant
colleague later mockingly tells Galloway: “‘I strenuously object?’
Is that how it works? Hm? ‘Objection.’ ‘Overruled.’ ‘Oh, no, no,
no. No, I STRENUOUSLY object.’ ‘Oh. Well, if you
strenuously object then I should take some time to
reconsider.’” 238
Even if one goes back to the Commission’s 2006 attempt
to define the scope of profane language, 239 problems persist. The
Commission wrote then that it would confine profane language
“to the universe of words that are sexual or excretory in nature
or are derived from such terms.” 240 If one cobbles this limitation
onto the current definition on the FCC’s website, then profane
language appears to mean grossly offensive sexual and
excretorial words that amount to a public nuisance. The
Commission also added in 2006 that presumptively profane words
were “the most offensive words in the English language” 241 that
are “likely to shock the viewer and disturb the peace and quiet of
the home,” 242 seemingly adding flesh to the concept of a public
nuisance. After combining this into a cohesive definition that
arguably construes profane language in a narrow manner to save
it from vagueness and overbreadth problems, one is left with this
possibility: Profane language encompasses the most grossly offensive
sexual and excretorial words that cause shock and disturb the peace and
quiet of the home.
Beyond making the questionable assumption that the
atmosphere in American homes is one of peace and quiet, the
words “shock” and “disturb” are equally as vague as “grossly
offensive.” What may shock one listener may not shock another
237
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and, in fact, may be entertaining. What might disturb one home
might not another. Furthermore, the more one hears words like
“shit” and “fuck” uttered in everyday life, it stands to reason the
shock and disruption power of those words decreases when they
are repeatedly heard on the broadcast airwaves. In other words,
the power of words to offend, shock and disturb is fluid and
constantly evolving, thus denying broadcasters the fair notice
that due process requires and that the void-for-vagueness
doctrine demands for knowing what words, in fact, are profane.
We now live in a world in which the President of the
United States discusses grabbing women by the pussy 243 and
refers to some countries as shitholes. 244 To some this may offend,
but to others this may make Trump more authentic and real.
More than forty-five years later, Cohen’s maxim that “one man’s
vulgarity is another’s lyric” 245 illustrates why regulating speech
based on its supposed offensiveness, as the FCC now attempts to
do with profane language, is unconstitutional because it is
plagued by vagueness issues. In brief, “some viewers take offense
to cursing on television whereas others barely notice.” 246
In addition to problems with vagueness, the FCC’s
definition of profane language has overbreadth issues. In 2008,
in United States v. Williams, 247 the Court crisply explained the
overbreadth doctrine in scenarios where free speech lies in the
balance. Writing for the Williams majority, Justice Antonin
Scalia wrote, “[a]ccording to our First Amendment overbreadth
doctrine, a statute is facially invalid if it prohibits a substantial
amount of protected speech.” 248 He added, “we have vigorously
enforced the requirement that a statute’s overbreadth
be substantial, not only in an absolute sense, but also relative to
the statute’s plainly legitimate sweep.” 249
The first step in an overbreadth analysis, Scalia explained,
“is to construe the challenged statute; it is impossible to
determine whether a statute reaches too far without first knowing
what the statute covers.” 250 The second step is determining if the
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statute penalizes “a substantial amount of protected expressive
activity.” 251
If the FCC’s definition of profane language is construed
narrowly in the manner suggested above to encompass only the
most grossly offensive sexual and excretorial words that cause shock and
disturb the peace and quiet of the home, this still is overbroad because
it is not hemmed in by the fighting words exception to the First
Amendment. As addressed earlier, statutes targeting profanity
are only permissible today if narrowly construed to apply in
fighting words scenarios. 252 Given that broadcast television
inherently does not involve the in-person utterance of personally
abusive epithets targeting a specific individual, the FCC’s
definition of profane language fails an overbreadth analysis.
B. The Growing Wall of Protection for Offensive Expression
The FCC’s current definition of profane language centers
directly on the alleged offensiveness of words. 253 As this section
illustrates, that focus strongly militates against the definition’s
constitutionality under the First Amendment. That is especially
true given the Supreme Court’s protection of offensive
expression in multiple contexts under the leadership of Chief
Justice John Roberts.
As discussed earlier, the Supreme Court in Cohen v.
California 254 made it clear that secularized profanity—in Cohen,
the word was “fuck”—is sometimes protected by the First
Amendment. 255 Paul Robert Cohen’s conviction, the Court
wrote, involved a statute that targeted “offensive conduct” 256 and
rested squarely “upon the asserted offensiveness of the words [he]
used to convey his message to the public.” 257
Suggesting precisely the type of vagueness problems
addressed in Section A that plague regulating speech based on
offensiveness, the Court in Cohen wrote “one man’s vulgarity is
another’s lyric.” 258 In rejecting the argument that states such as
California can punish the use of “fuck” in an effort “to maintain
what they regard as a suitable level of discourse within the body
politic,” 259 the Court queried: “How is one to distinguish this
from any other offensive word?” 260 In brief, it concluded that
251
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regulating speech because of its supposed offensiveness “seems
inherently boundless” 261 and “governmental officials cannot
make principled distinctions in this area.” 262
Subsequent to Cohen, the Court protected offensive
speech in the 1980s in cases involving a man who burned an
American flag in political protest 263 and a magazine which
suggested, in an advertisement parody, that a famous reverend
had sex with his mother in an outhouse and was drunk while
preaching. 264 In the former case, Texas v. Johnson, 265 Justice
William Brennan opined for the majority that “[i]f there is a
bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the
government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply
because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable.” 266
In the latter decision, Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 267 Chief Justice
William Rehnquist called the speech in question “offensive” 268
to plaintiff Jerry Falwell and “doubtless gross and repugnant in
the eyes of most.” 269 Nonetheless, a unanimous Court protected
pornographer Larry Flynt’s flagship publication against a tort
claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress based on its
parodic speech. 270 Rehnquist wrote that a jury could not be
allowed “to impose liability on the basis of the jurors’ tastes or
views, or perhaps on the basis of their dislike of a particular
expression.” 271
In much more recent cases, the Court has reiterated the
principle that speech must not be squelched simply because it
offends—continuing a movement that spells additional trouble
for the FCC’s definition of profane language that pivots on
offensiveness. 272
For example, in penning the majority opinion in
Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission, 273
Justice Anthony Kennedy observed in 2018 that “it is not, as the
Court has repeatedly held, the role of the State or its officials to
prescribe what shall be offensive.” 274 Justice Clarence Thomas,
in a concurrence joined by Justice Neil Gorsuch, added in
261
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Masterpiece Cakeshop that “[s]tates cannot punish protected
speech because some group finds it offensive, hurtful, stigmatic,
unreasonable, or undignified.” 275 Thomas emphasized that a rule
allowing the government to squelch speech because it is offensive
or disagreeable “would allow the government to stamp out
virtually any speech at will.” 276
In 2017—just one year before Masterpiece Cakeshop—the
Court protected offensive speech in Matal v. Tam. 277 The Court
in Tam struck down part of a federal statute that allowed the U.S.
Patent and Trademark Office to deny registration for marks that
“may disparage . . . persons, living or dead, institutions, beliefs,
or national symbols.” 278 In delivering the Court’s judgment,
Justice Samuel Alito concluded that this provision, known as the
disparagement
clause,
“offends
a
bedrock First
Amendment principle: Speech may not be banned on the ground
that it expresses ideas that offend.” 279 Alito added that “[s]peech
that demeans on the basis of race, ethnicity, gender, religion, age,
disability, or any other similar ground is hateful; but the proudest
boast of our free speech jurisprudence is that we protect the
freedom to express ‘the thought that we hate.’” 280
Concurring in Tam, Justice Kennedy buttressed this
point, writing that “the Court’s cases have long prohibited the
government from justifying a First Amendment burden by
pointing to the offensiveness of the speech to be suppressed.” 281
Kennedy intimated that the marketplace of ideas 282 provides the
remedy for offensive speech, not government censorship, when
he opined that:
A law that can be directed against
speech found offensive to some
portion of the public can be turned
against minority and dissenting
views to the detriment of all. The
First Amendment does not entrust
that power to the government’s
275
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278
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280
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(Holmes, J., dissenting)).
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See RODNEY A. S MOLLA, FREE SPEECH IN AN OPEN SOCIETY 6 (1992) (“The
‘marketplace of ideas’ is perhaps the most powerful metaphor in the free speech
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benevolence. Instead, our reliance
must be on the substantial
safeguards of free and open
discussion
in
a
democratic
society. 283
Tam thus reaffirms “there is no categorical carve-out from
First Amendment protection for either offensive or hateful
speech.” 284 In a nutshell, and as encapsulated by New York Times
Supreme Court reporter Adam Liptak, Tam stands for the
proposition “that the government may not refuse to register
potentially offensive names.” 285
The Supreme Court also protected offensive speech in
2011 in Snyder v. Phelps. 286 There, an eight-justice majority
shielded the defendants from tort liability for expressing
offensive messages including “‘God Hates Fags,’ ‘You’re Going
to Hell’ and ‘God Hates You.’” 287 Writing for the majority, Chief
Justice John Roberts remarked that “[s]uch speech cannot be
restricted simply because it is upsetting or arouses contempt,” 288
particularly when it involves matters of public concern. 289 He
added that “[i]n most circumstances, ‘the Constitution does not
permit the government to decide which types of otherwise
protected speech are sufficiently offensive to require protection
for the unwilling listener or viewer.’” 290 In a grand rhetorical
flourish closing his opinion that explains why such offensive
expression must be protected, Roberts wrote:
Speech is powerful. It can stir
people to action, move them to
tears of both joy and sorrow, and—
as it did here—inflict great pain. On
the facts before us, we cannot react
to that pain by punishing the
speaker. As a Nation we have
chosen a different course—to
protect even hurtful speech on
283
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Decision, N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 2017, at A14.
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562 U.S. 443 (2011).
287
Id. at 448.
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See id. at 454 (noting that the speech at issue “plainly relates to broad issues of
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public issues to ensure that we do
not stifle public debate. 291
Snyder, as Professor Joseph Russumanno summarizes it,
fell in line with “the Supreme Court’s long-established tradition
of favoring speech protection even in cases involving offensive
speech.” 292
Beyond safeguarding offensive words, the Roberts’ Court
has struck down statutes targeting graphic images some people
might deem offensive. Specifically, in United States v. Stevens,293
the Court refused to carve out a new exception from First
Amendment protection for images depicting animal cruelty. 294
In the process, it declared as unconstitutionally overbroad a
federal statute regulating such images. 295 One year later, in Brown
v. Entertainment Merchants Association, 296 the Court struck down a
California statute limiting minors’ access to video games
depicting images of violence. 297 Writing for the majority, Justice
Antonin Scalia noted that there is no exception to First
Amendment protection for “whatever a legislature finds
shocking.” 298
The Court has also protected statements at which one
might take offense (offense in the sense of umbrage at the fact
that someone would utter such a statement), even though the
words used do not involve profanity or swearing. In particular,
in United States v. Alvarez, 299 the Court struck down a federal law
that criminalized lies about having won a Congressional Medal
of Honor. 300 Justice Kennedy wrote there for a four-justice
plurality that
[t]he Nation well knows that one of
the costs of the First Amendment is
that it protects the speech we detest
as well as the speech we embrace.
Though
few
might
find
291

Id. at 460–61.
Joseph Russomanno, “Freedom for the Thought That We Hate”: Why Westboro Had
To Win, 7 COMM. L. & P OL’Y 133, 172 (2012).
293
559 U.S. 460 (2010).
294
Id. at 472.
295
Id. at 482.
296
564 U.S. 786 (2011).
297
Id. at 805.
298
Id. at 793.
299
567 U.S. 709 (2012).
300
Id. at 730. First Amendment scholar Rodney Smolla, writing in 2012, puts Alvarez,
along with Snyder v. Phelps and United States v. Stevens, among “[t]he three most highprofile offensive speech cases in recent years.” Rodney A. Smolla, Categories, Tiers of
Review, and the Roiling Sea of Free Speech Doctrine and Principle: A Methodological Critique
of United States v. Alvarez, 76 A LB. L. REV . 499, 520 (2012).
292

2019]

THE FCC AND PROFANE LANGUAGE

181

respondent’s statements anything
but contemptible, his right to make
those statements is protected by the
Constitution’s
guarantee
of
freedom
of
speech
and
expression. 301
Perhaps the only case under the leadership of Chief
Justice Roberts in which the Court failed to protect offensive
speech from government censorship came in the five-to-four
decision in Walker v. Texas Division, Sons of Confederate Veterans.302
In Walker, the Court upheld Texas’s decision to deny an
application for a specialty license plate featuring Confederate
battle flag imagery “‘because public comments ha[d] shown that
many members of the general public find the design offensive,
and because such comments are reasonable.’” 303
Walker, however, is explained away as an outlier by the
majority’s belief that specialty license plates in Texas constitute
government speech, rather than private expression. 304 This
categorization, in turn, rendered nugatory any First
Amendment-based speech challenges to Texas’s actions because,
as Justice Stephen Breyer wrote for the majority, “[w]hen
government speaks, it is not barred by the Free Speech Clause
from determining the content of what it says.” 305 Texas was thus
“entitled to refuse to issue plates featuring” Confederate battle
flag imagery. 306
In summary, the Supreme Court in recent cases including
Masterpiece Cakeshop, Tam, and Phelps has reinvigorated its
enduring doctrine of protecting offensive expression. As
Professor Erica Goldberg recently observed, “America has
uniquely expansive free speech protections, even for the most
intolerant, offensive speech.” 307 That certainly is true today, as
this subsection indicates. All of this suggests yet another reason
why the FCC’s definition of profane language revolving around
offensiveness is likely unconstitutional in the Roberts’ Court era.
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CONCLUSION
It is important to understand that 18 U.S.C. § 1464, the
statute that gives the FCC authority over profane language on
the broadcast airwaves, is criminal in nature 308 and carries with
it a possible prison sentence. 309 Specifically, it provides that
broadcasters, who carry such content, “shall be fined under this
title or imprisoned not more than two years, or both.” 310
Despite the gravity of such sanctions, the FCC’s current
definition of profane language: (1) is problematically vague and
overbroad; 311 (2) overlaps with the Commission’s definition of
indecency; 312 and (3) has not been invoked by the FCC to punish
broadcasters since at least 2012 when the Supreme Court invited
the FCC to consider adjusting its indecency regime. 313 Therefore,
to the extent it penalizes profane language, 18 U.S.C. § 1464 is a
prime example of “legal obsolescence” 314 that should spark both
its prompt reconsideration and revision by Congress.
Furthermore, and to the point that it now is clear—Chaplinsky
dicta to the contrary 315—that profanity is generally protected by
the First Amendment, 316 18 U.S.C. § 1464’s prohibition on
profane language is an example of what Guido Calabresi aptly
called “legal petrification.” 317 Congress must act because, as
Calabresi concluded more than thirty-five years ago, “as a single
solution to statutory obsolescence, the independent
administrative agency and the government bureau have been a
dismal disappointment.” 318
That assessment was not always true when it came to the
FCC’s regulation of profane language. In fact, the FCC in
August of 1976 recommended that Congress revoke the
Commission’s authority over profane language due to concerns
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that it was likely unconstitutional. 319 Richard E. Wiley, then
chairman of the FCC, 320 explained in a letter to Vice President
Nelson Rockefeller and the members of the U.S. Senate that
“[b]ecause of the serious constitutional problems involved, we
have recommended deletion of the ‘profanity’ provision.” 321
In the “Explanation of Proposed Amendment”
memorandum that accompanied Wiley’s letter, the FCC
justified its effort to have Congress remove its power over
profane language by noting, among other things, “the
infrequency with which modern courts have construed the word
‘profane,’ and the sparsity of decisions which have upheld it
against constitutional attack.” 322 The memo cites the U.S.
Supreme Court’s decision in Burstyn v. Wilson, 323 addressed
earlier in this Article, 324 as casting doubt on definitions of
“profane” involving religious overtones 325 that “are drawn from
decisions dating back into the last century.” 326 The memo also
contends
that
definitions
“fraught
with
religious
connotations” 327 “raise questions under the Free Exercise Clause
of the First Amendment as well as questions of vagueness and
overbreadth.” 328 Furthermore, the memo notes that Chaplinsky’s
language regarding fighting words would not apply to profanities
on the broadcast media because “there is no physical contact
between speaker and hearer in electronic communication.” 329
Congress, however, failed to take action on Chairman
Wiley’s recommendation regarding profane language, as
evidenced by the fact that “profane language” remains in 18
U.S.C. § 1464 today. Had Congress heeded his advice more than
forty years ago, the muddle today (and this very article, in fact)
would not exist.
When the FCC eventually did update its definition of
profane language fifteen years ago, it did so only when
319
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threatened by a moral panic 330 and, as the Second Circuit
observed in 2007, set “forth no independent reasons that would
justify its newly-expanded definition of ‘profane’ speech, aside
from merely stating that its prior precedent does not prevent it
from setting forth a new definition.” 331 The FCC will likely
never, at least on its own volition in today’s political climate,
publicly profess to ceasing enforcement of anti-profanity rules on
the airwaves. After all, what administrative agency wants to be
deemed a supporter of profanity? Surely, this would be the rallying
cry of family-friendly public interest groups if the Commission
announces its decision to engage in wholesale regulatory
forbearance 332 when it comes to enforcing its statutory power
over profanity.
The phrase “profane language” thus should be eliminated
by lawmakers from 18 U.S.C. § 1464 unless the Commission acts
immediately to better define that term. Abolishing the
Commission’s authority over profanity would still leave it with
power over obscenity—a constitutionally troubling clout, as the
Supreme Court holds that such speech falls outside the sphere of
First Amendment protection 333—and indecency.
The bottom line is that times change, and the law, in turn,
sometimes must change with it. The federal statute that grants
the FCC power over profane language was adopted in 1948, 334
while Section 29 of the Radio Act of 1927 gave the Federal Radio
Commission (the precursor to the FCC) power over profane
language. 335 That is more than seventy years ago if one counts
from 1948 and more than ninety years if one starts all the way
back in 1927.
Either way, administrative agency statutory power over
broadcast profanity has been on the books for decades without
being revisited by Congress. It is, in brief, a legislative remnant
of a bygone era when the profane was more closely related to
330

See supra Part II.
Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 489 F.3d 444, 461 (2d Cir. 2007), rev’d, 556
U.S. 502 (2009).
332
Regulatory forebearance, as used here, means “withdrawing from the regulation
of certain, previously regulated activities.” Jon Stern, Regulatory Forbearance: Why Did
Oftel Find It So Hard?, 28 TELECOMM. POL ’Y 273, 278 (2004).
333
See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957) (writing that “obscenity is not
within the area of constitutionally protected speech or press”).
334
It was in 1948 that Congress transferred the FCC’s power over profane language
to 18 U.S.C. § 1464. Edythe Wise, A Historical Perspective on the Protection of Children
from Broadcasting Indecency, 3 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 15, 22 (1996). See FCC v.
Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 738 (1978) (“In 1948, when the Criminal Code was
revised to include provisions that had previously been located in other Titles of the
United States Code, the prohibition against obscene, indecent, and profane
broadcasts was removed from the Communications Act and re-enacted as § 1464 of
Title 18.”).
335
See Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. at 735–37 (addressing the history of the power to
punish obscenity, indecency and profane language on the broadcast airwaves).
331

2019]

THE FCC AND PROFANE LANGUAGE

185

religion and, in turn, does not comport with today’s linguistic
culture. As this author contended elsewhere, “[a]ny piece of
legislation captures only the concerns, agonies and worries of
lawmakers, their constituents and, perhaps, the news media at a
single point in time, akin to a static legislative snapshot rather
than a continually unspooling reel of film.” 336 Unless the FCC
takes immediate action to redefine profane language in a
constitutional manner, Congress itself should amend 18 U.S.C.
§ 1464 by removing “profane language” and not replacing it with
another category of expression. Given that the Supreme Court
today protects much speech that offends, adopting a new
category of regulated expression to replace the profanity
classification would almost inevitably prove to be
constitutionally futile.
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